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Why a carbon tax? 
People normally pay the private cost of CO2, but not the 
social cost. The private cost is given by the price of each 
unit of CO2, usually measured in tonnes, which in turn is 
the result of a series of market contingencies: the costs of 
extracting, processing, and selling fossil fuels, taking also 
into consideration the interplay between supply and de-
mand. The social cost of CO2, instead, is obtained by sum-
ming the private cost of CO2 to the climate damage it is 
expected to cause (Cho 2021, Wagner et al. 2021). The cli-
mate change we are experiencing now is nothing more than 
the result of the negative CO2 externalities of the past.  
If we set aside the complex ethical question of responsibil-
ity for past emissions (Meyer & Sanklecha 2017), a simple 
solution to this market inefficiency is to get people to inter-
nalise the social cost of the CO2 they emit, through a car-
bon tax. This is not only because it is ethically sound (e.g., in 
virtue of the polluter pays principle) , but also because it is 
the most effective (and non-coercive) way to make people 
reduce their emissions to a level that we can consider as 
economically efficient (Metcalf 2019: 35-71; Rabe 2018: 1-
12) – keeping into consideration both the marginal benefits 
of CO2 emissions and the resulting climate damage. 
Which carbon tax? 
The carbon tax is usually seen as part of a broader fiscal 
policy, consisting of both taxation and revenue spending. 
Regarding the taxation part, there are basically two differ-
ent approaches. A first approach consists in setting the mar-
ket price of CO2 on its social cost (SCC). Economists usually 
calculate SCC through complex mathematical models that 
take into account future climate change based on the 
amount of GHGs expected to be in the atmosphere, the 
effects that certain marginal changes in average tempera-
ture will have on the planet, socio-economic data, and the 
discount rate of future utility (see Nordhaus 2017; 
Fleurbaey et al. 2019). 
SCC is not only a useful fiscal yardstick but also a more 
general and fundamental parameter of economic policy. It 
indicates how rational it is to invest in climate mitigation 
today by deducting avoided climate damage from invest-
ment costs. So, for example, the medium-term cost of an 
economic project that requires N dollars and produces an 
emission reduction of X tonnes of CO2, should be calculated 
by subtracting X*SCC from N. The assessment of SCC is both 
a technical question (what data to include in the models) 
and an ethical-political one (what discount rate to apply to 
future utility), so it is not surprising that there are different 
numbers attributed to SCC. The task force set up by US 
President Obama, for example, quantified the SCC upwards 
in 2013 at $51 (measured in 2020 dollars) per tonne of CO2. 
His successor, Trump, reduced SCC to as low as $1, effec-
tively excluding global damages from the total cost of CO2 
emitted in the US and more than doubling the discount rate 
of future utility. Newly-elected Biden then requested a re-
calculation, and his advisers provisionally reset the SCC to 
$51, reserving a year to study the issue further (Samuel 
2021). 
The second approach is to set the carbon tax rate not in 
relation to the SCC but to a specific mitigation target 
(Kaufman et al. 2020). Suppose, for example, that a country 
wants to reduce its emissions by half by 2030. The national 
carbon budget for the climate target is calculated and a car-
bon tax rate is set to achieve this target. Obviously, an auto-
matic adjustment mechanism will have to be introduced to 
keep the tax rate steady on the basis of intermediate cli-
mate results achieved or missed (Metcalf 2019: 111). This 
type of approach shifts some of the moral and economic 
responsibility for past emissions onto the present genera-
tion. If the mitigation target is an ambitious one (e.g., it is in 
line with the Paris Agreement’s goal of limiting global 
warming to 2/1.5 °C, compared to pre-industrial levels) and 
the SCC is considered to be around $50 (as postulated by 
the Obama administration), a SCC-based carbon tax  will be 
lower than a target-based carbon tax (see Stern and Stiglitz 
2021).   
It can be discussed at length whether the carbon tax is 
regressive or not, i.e., whether it hits the poor more than 
the rich or vice versa (Andersson 2021  ; Carattini et al. 
2019; Metcalf 2019: 91-98). But the fact remains that it is a 
tax that raises the price of a range of goods and services 
that everyone needs, from electricity and heating that we 
use in our homes, to transport, especially on wheels. As 
such, it obviously meets with social resistance, especially 
from the poorer classes. As I said before, however, this is 
only part of the story. Because the carbon tax generates 
revenues and it is how the revenues are spent that deter-
mines whether and how regressive or progressive the tax 
reform of which the carbon tax is a part is (there is no room 
here to discuss the magnitude, but suffice it to mention that 
according to Gilbert Metcalf a carbon tax of $50 per tonne 
of CO2 would produce a fiscal revenue of $200 billion in the 
first year alone, see Metcalf 2019: 87).  
There are two major ways of investing carbon tax reve-
nues (Marron & Morris 2016; Marten & van Dender 2019; 
Fried et al. 2020). One is to give revenue back to the peo-
ple, either through reductions in other taxes or simply 
through rebates (which can be more or less equal). This is 
the revenue-neutral carbon tax (RN-CT): the government 
obtains climate mitigation without increasing its budget. 
Another method, instead, consists in using revenues to ex-
pand government spending, i.e., by earmarking revenues 
for new projects (either climate or non-climate related) or 
for reducing public debt. This is a revenue-positive carbon 
tax (RP-CT). 
A RP-CT tends to be regressive, and it also reinforces ine-
quality. The new jobs and the new sectors (climate, AI, 
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technology, and so on) that could be financed through the 
carbon revenues require on average a high know-how;  
therefore, what you take away from the poorest in terms of 
lost jobs and higher bills, you cannot give back to them 
through new jobs and new opportunities (at least, not in 
the short term, before reconverting the poorest part of the 
workforce). On the contrary, a RN-CT, if designed in the 
right way, can become an egalitarian policy that not only 
tries to solve the climate issue but also corrects macro-
economic distortions that are independent of the environ-
ment. 
An egalitarian use of carbon revenues 
There are two main possible ways of devising a RN-CT - 
and by combining these two methods in different ways, 
different policy packages can be obtained. One way is to 
give people equal rebates. By doing so, you obtain a fiscal 
policy that is slightly egalitarian (Metcalf 2019: 95-98; Cecco 
2018). The poorest will probably get back a bit more than 
they paid through the carbon tax. Those in the middle will 
see their situation almost unchanged. The richer will receive 
back a bit less than they were taxed. This is in substance a 
fiscal reform that seeks to maintain the status quo quite 
unaltered – except for some redistribution from the top 
towards the bottom. And also, the fact the everyone is enti-
tled to carbon revenues conveys the message that the car-
bon tax will not be too intrusive in pre-tax social arrange-
ments – it will seek, as far as possible, not to allocate net 
costs to anyone. Alternatively, you may want to earmark 
revenues for certain social groups, thus altering existing 
power equilibria: e.g., you could distribute the revenues 
between the poor and middle classes, either through tax 
credits or even direct transfers (see Paoli and van der Ploeg 
2021).1 This policy would be progressive, but it would in-
volve two problems: where very distortionary taxes are in 
place (e.g. a high tax wedge, as we will see later), this policy 
would mobilise a lot of money but would not correct the 
problems of economic inefficiency (although it would stimu-
late consumer demand  ); it would meet with strong politi-
cal opposition from the wealthiest, and it would therefore 
be difficult, if not impossible, to get approved. 
Arguably, a progressive and leftist carbon tax should be 
revenue-neutral through a dual policy package: first, it 
should use some revenues to offset price increases for the 
poor and middle classes; second, it should use the remain-
ing part of revenues to lower taxes on labour income (both 
employed and self-employed income) for those below a 
middle-income threshold. I will briefly examine three rea-
sons why such a revenue-neutral and dual-package carbon 
tax (RN-DP-CT) could (and should) become central in the 
political agenda of the European Left – even though much 
of what I will suggest can reasonably hold also with respect 
to other countries.  
The first reason is simply that the tax wage on labour in 
the euro area is one of the highest in the world: in some 
countries, like Belgium, Italy, Austria, France and Germany, 
the net pay of the employee is over 45 percent lower than 
the cost of her/his labour for the employer (OECD 2021). 
The high cost of human labour creates several problems for 
the working class. Entrepreneurs have all the interest in 
accelerating investments in automation, faster than any 
society committed to a sustainable technological transition 
can stand; and imbalances of market power allow employ-
ers to shift the burden of the tax wedge onto workers, by 
reducing wages. High taxes on self-employment income, in 
turn, force low- and medium-income self-employed work-
ers in a race to the bottom on the costs of their services 
(this leads to a reduction in their income and obviously cre-
ates strong incentives to evade taxes). 
By lowering labour costs (for low- and middle-income 
earners), a RN-DP-CT is more egalitarian than any RP-CT, 
because it creates new opportunities for all workers, not 
simply those who could be easily employed in the mid- and 
high-tech sectors, and at the same time it shields the unem-
ployed from price increases – the unemployed do not get 
better off, as the employed, but they neither suffer a net 
loss. Conversely, a RN-CT that simply gives rebates to the 
middle and poor classes would benefit both employed and 
unemployed equally, but it would not be as supportive of 
economic growth as the RN-DP-CT - which, it should be re-
called, can benefit the unemployed indirectly, by enlarging 
employment opportunities.  
The second advantage of a RN-DP-CT is that it will redis-
tribute wealth from capital towards labour in a way that is 
supposed to be welcomed by the Left: i.e., by taxing more 
capital that yields income without a proportional increase 
in labour demand, rather than capital that creates new job 
opportunities. If, for example, you earn income exclusively 
in the form of rents, by managing your real estate, or 
through financial activities, the RN-DP-CT will make you a 
net-loser.2 If you are a worker, instead, the cost of your la-
bour will go down, so there will be more (and perhaps even 
better paid) job opportunities: what you lose with the car-
bon tax, you get back again through your job contract, in 
the form of tax cuts. 
Therefore, if you are a worker, the RN-DP-CT can make 
you better off in two ways. First, if you are a low/middle-
income worker, your energy consumption is likely low 
enough to allow you to obtain net benefits from the carbon 
tax reform. Second, if you also start ethically spending your 
income, shifting to green products and green energy 
sources, you are likely to increase even further your net 
income in the medium term. This is both because you will 
reduce the impact of the carbon tax on your consumption 
and because the price of green goods could be reasonably 
expected to fall over time.  
The third argument in support of a RN-DP-CT is that we 
live in extremely unequal societies. World billionaires now 
control the same amount of wealth as has been spent by all 
G20 governments in response to the Covid-19 pandemic, 
roughly 11.95 trillion dollars (Oxfam 2021: 23). At the same 
time, the richest 1 percent is responsible for 15 percent of 
global emissions from 1990 to 2015 (and the richest 10 per-
cent is responsible for 52 percent of global emissions, see 
Oxfam 2020: 3). I see no moral reason why a carbon tax 
reform should not aim, among other things, to take wealth 
away from the richest. 
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1 Consider also that if you believe in trickle-down econom-
ics, you may also want to devise a RN-CT that earmarks the 
rich, i.e., using carbon revenues to lower corporate taxes 
(see Fried et al. 2021) 
2 You will pay more than you get back, unless you become 
an ethical investor and consumer. 
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